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Abstract 
This CEPS Special Report contributes to the debate on the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), 
which was proposed by the European Commission in early 2014. The MSR aims to introduce 
a degree of supply management into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). With the 
proposal soon to be considered, this report presents the MSR’s rationale, and reviews the 
different options available for its design, governance and timing, as well as its consequences 
for the functioning of the EU ETS and the EU’s climate and energy policy. Based on discussions 
in various stakeholder meetings organised by the CEPS Carbon Market Forum throughout 
2014, the report takes the view that if the MSR is needed to ensure better market functioning 
of the still-young EU carbon, there do not seem to be good technical reasons that would 
advocate for the delay of its implementation.  
Disclaimer 
This report is based on CEPS’ research and was informed by various meetings and 
consultations with EU ETS stakeholders. The views expressed are attributable only to the 
author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is associated. The views 
presented in this paper cannot be attributed to any stakeholder or participant in the events 
leading up to this report. 
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Executive Summary 
The proposed Market Stability Reserve (MSR) should be seen as an instrument that will rectify 
one side of the lack of supply flexibility in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) (resulting 
from a rigid auctioning schedule), and as a means to ensure good market functioning and price 
discovery.   
Market flexibility provisions exist in all carbon pricing mechanisms introduced in other 
jurisdictions, e.g. California, Quebec, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and 
Australia (repealed in July 2014), in recognition of this shortcoming of a regulatory market.  
In the cases mentioned above, the market stability provision is based on a price trigger, which 
is less desirable from a market point of view, and challenging to implement in the EU, given 
the institutional realities. Therefore the option of an MSR based on a volumetric trigger is 
preferable. 
If the MSR is needed, we see no objective reason why it should not be implemented, as soon 
as the legislative process allows it. Any perceived positive effects that can be seen as arising 
from postponing its introduction would be greatly overshadowed by the negative 
consequences. 
The negative consequences resulting from a postponement could be significant, and would 
include EU ETS reputational risks, resulting from market functioning failing to provide a price 
signal to achieve its long-term objectives. It would also include significant price volatility at 
the end of Phase 3 resulting from the re-injection of the backloaded allowances in the auction 
schedule. There does not seem to be any reasonable market justification, under current EU ETS 
provisions, for not placing the backloaded amount directly in the MSR. As with changes in 
other EU ETS provisions, they can, and should, be addressed through appropriate governance.  
Stakeholders, especially industry covered by the EU ETS, have expressed concerns regarding 
the impact of the early introduction of the MSR on carbon prices, in the absence of post-2020 
carbon leakage risk mitigation measures. These concerns, are legitimate, but largely of a non-
technical nature, and do not detract from the merit of an early introduction of the MSR. 
However, it is important that competitive concerns be addressed expeditiously, through the 
political process. It must also be noted that the EUA price to determine inclusion on the Carbon 
Leakage List is €30, which provides for a higher price than currently observed in the market. 
Our analysis also shows that MSR governance will be critical to its success. It needs to provide 
consistency and predictability. While formulas and rules will provide the backbone of the MSR 
governance, it will also have to include flexibility provisions. It is unlikely that we will manage 
to provide for every contingency this time round. As such, there needs to be provisions that 
would allow not only for periodic reviews, but also for revisions that can be triggered by a 
mechanism such as the annual EU carbon market report. 
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1. Overview 
On 22 January 2014, the European Commission introduced the “Proposal for a Decision of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment and operation of a 
Market Stability Reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC”.  
This legislative proposal was introduced at the same time as the proposed framework for the 
EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy policies, which is intended to reinforce the process of de-
carbonisation of the EU economy, and promote security of energy supply.  
As outlined in the “Explanatory Memorandum”, the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) was 
proposed with the aim of addressing the concerns that investment decisions were being made 
against the background of an oversupply of allowances, resulting in a less than economically 
efficient way of reaching the ambitious mid-to-long term EU greenhouse gas reduction 
objectives. 
The proposed MSR would ensure that when certain preselected levels of EUAs1 (European 
Union Allowances) in circulation are broken (both floor and ceiling), then allowances would 
be taken out of the auction schedule, and put in the MSR (in case of excess supply), or re-
inserted in the auctioning schedule (in case of insufficient amount in circulation). 
This paper intends to address a number of questions, with a view to making a constructive 
contribution to the debate on the proposed MSR: 
1. Is the MSR needed, and what problem(s) does it intend to solve? 
2. What is the timing for the introduction of the MSR? 
3. What are the options for governance? 
4. What is the nature and level of thresholds? 
5. What is the rate of input/output in the MSR? 
6. How does it interact with other policies? 
2. Background views 
A number of facts and fundamentals, related to the EU ETS, and relevant to the MSR policy 
and technical discussions, need to be acknowledged.  
Firstly, the EU ETS was conceived as a pure regulatory market whose stated objective is to 
“promote reductions of greenhouse emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient 
manner”. It was intended to become the cornerstone of the EU climate change policy and help 
reach targets under the Kyoto Protocol and EU climate change policies in general. 
For some, the unstated objective of the EU ETS was to drive not only operational change, but 
especially a technological revolution, which would steer capital towards cleaner sources of 
energy, and assist with energy efficiency, and the development and deployment of 
renewables. 
For others, a GHG market is a technologically neutral instrument of price discovery, helping 
to minimise the overall societal costs of compliance with GHG reduction obligations. In such 
a view, if the price of carbon becomes zero in a particular trading period, it is not a concern, as 
it would signal that the problem is solved, and there is no demand for the product 
(allowances). 
                                                   
1 EUAs are the tradable unit under the EU ETS. One EUA represents the right to emit 1 tonne of CO2. 
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However, it must be emphasised that the problem referred to is the reduction of GHG 
emissions from anthropogenic sources by 80% in 2050, and not only an in-period objective, 
while we still have long-term, un-met objectives. Only by meeting both the short-term and 
long-term objectives can economic efficacy be achieved. This requires a visibility of the 
environmental objective post-2020, to 2030, and beyond.  
Secondly, the carbon market must function in line with the principles of sustainable 
development, in that the environmental and economic aspects must be balanced.  
The price of EUAs, which is important to achieve the environmental objectives, needs to be 
balanced with the cost of carbon, which carry with it competitiveness and carbon leakage 
risks for those installations covered by the EU ETS. The price of EUAs does not necessarily 
translate into carbon costs, as installations covered by the Carbon Leakage list receive free 
allocation. 
Thirdly, the market created by the EU ETS has functioned well, as measured against some of 
the criteria that reflect good market functioning. These include: the presence of liquidity in the 
market, although many participants; a tight spread between bid and ask prices; the ability to 
enter and exit the market at all times; adequate market transparency and information; and the 
fact that the market is not driven by market power. 
Fourthly, the GHG market has certain unique features, including: 
 It is a purely regulatory market, a construct, and one that is still new. It still is in the 
process of acquiring a track record and the long-term credibility that other non-regulatory 
commodity markets have built over decades or more. 
 It has a clear policy goal of reducing GHG emissions at a minimum cost to society. 
 The traded product can be seen as having the characteristics of both a commodity and a 
currency. 
 Demand fluctuates, and is influenced by cyclical (economic) and structural changes 
(technology changes, interaction with other policies, etc.).  
 Supply is inelastic. It must be emphasised that supply flexibility has two aspects: through 
free allocation (based on historical production levels, which can be divorced from the 
realities of the economic cycle) and through the auctioning schedule (set well in advance). 
For a complete solution, both sides need to be addressed. 
Finally, there is the reality that there is currently an excess of EUAs in the market, which the 
2012 Carbon Market Report estimated at 955 million in early 2012 (it is now estimated to have 
reached over 2 billion allowances, i.e. more than a full year of allowances under the EU ETS). 
This excess supply can be seen as resulting primarily from a combination of the impact of the 
economic crisis, the larger-than-predicted impact of other policy actions (such as energy 
efficiency (EE) and renewable energy (RE) targets), the influx of international offsets, and the 
mitigation efforts by covered entities. 
To address this current excess supply, backloading was adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council in December 2013, which ensures that part of the surplus will be withheld 
from the auction schedule in 2014 -2016, and reintroduced in 2019 to 2020, a the end of the 
third trading period.  
It must therefore be concluded that the real objective of the EU ETS is good price discovery, 
in the context of meeting the 2050 environmental objective. This can only result from good 
market functioning, which will allow for rational economic decisions and asset allocation, to 
be made in the context of environmental scarcity (a limited amount of GHG that can be 
pumped in the atmosphere).  
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3. Flexibility in other jurisdictions 
Based on the brief overview of flexibility in other jurisdictions provided in Appendix 1, we 
can conclude that other jurisdictions that have introduced carbon pricing mechanisms (CPMs), 
such as California, Quebec, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and Australia, have 
also recognised the regulatory nature of the mechanism and made provisions to address the 
lack of flexibility on the supply side.  
In most cases prices were targeted. This can be seen as the result of the following 
considerations:  
 Price is often seen as a clear outcome that will influence the effectiveness of the market in 
attaining the fundamental goal of the jurisdiction in introducing an ETS.  
 While market liquidity is a purer way to assess good market functioning, it could have also 
been seen as being more in need of interpretation – what causes liquidity fluctuations?  
o Market liquidity will be influenced by the behaviour of market participants.  
o The behaviour of market participants from the financial sector (or with a financial 
background) is very different from those with a pure compliance mindset and will have 
significant impact on liquidity. Compliance buyers may act in a more ‘holding’ pattern 
with less price elasticity, and this may alter the normal parameters of liquidity over 
time.  
o The ‘hedging’ pattern of the power industry also changes, and may be a function of the 
energy mix and the degree of market liberalisation. 
 Price is an element that can be used as a trigger in the jurisdictions mentioned above, as 
there are no political or constitutional barriers to doing so. 
The approach has been developed mainly through a set of rules that ensures regulatory 
stability. However, the possibility of executive intervention exists, in case extreme 
circumstances should develop. 
4. MSR features and parameters 
To discuss the features and parameters of the MSR, it is necessary to establish the 
principles/criteria against which its design and functioning will be judged. The MSR can be 
judged on the basis of its impact on: 
a) Climate change action in the EU – the objective of the EU ETS to 2050, 
b) Its impact on EU ETS functioning as a market and 
c) Its impact on the competitiveness of the sectors covered. 
These criteria should form the core of the discussion of the proposed design and architecture 
of the MSR, as well as the value of its parameters. 
In designing the MSR, we must also make sure that we set a number of principles.  
The important principles that we see for the MSR are:  
 It must recognise that the core goal of the EU ETS is good price discovery, as discussed 
above. This implies that not all-excess supply of EUAs is ‘bad’. While it is difficult to 
determine the causes of excess supply of EUAs in the market in the short term, it is essential 
(and also possible) to do so in the mid-to-long term. The mandatory annual “State of the 
Carbon Market Report” is the appropriate vehicle for determining the causes of variation 
in supply, and specifying how to treat it.  
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 It must be consistent, principled, and easy to understand. Its actions must always be seen 
as working to ensure a level of liquidity that allows for good market functioning. 
 It should be activated only in the case of significant and cumulative changes in EUA in 
circulation; it cannot become an instrument with which to micro-manage the market. 
 It must work with the market and support market fundamentals. 
 It must be resilient and allow for flexibility: circumstances change, and by definition we 
cannot predict all scenarios and provide for them. 
 It must be predictable in its behaviour: its interventions must be well understood and 
follow the same logic. This may imply simply functioning based on rules, but it does not 
necessarily preclude the inclusion of other provisions to provide for the flexibility 
discussed above. Predictability does not imply automatic, formula-based intervention only 
– it can allow for some interpretation. 
4.1 Objectives of the MSR 
Let us now turn to the first question posed earlier: “Is the MSR needed, and what problem(s) 
is it intended to solve?” 
The main objective of the MSR is to address a design shortcoming in the ETS, namely the lack 
of flexibility on the supply side. Other objectives that have been mentioned in policy debates 
must fall within the logic of rectifying this lack of flexibility.  As already mentioned, however, 
the MSR can only address the lack of flexibility on the supply side which results from the fixed 
auctioning schedule. The lack of flexibility resulting from free allocation still needs to be 
addressed. 
It must be noted that some asymmetrical supply-side flexibility was provided in the EU ETS 
through Article 29a in cases of acute, and potentially abrupt, upwards price spikes. These 
would result from the market being short, and allows for additional liquidity to be injected in 
the market. However, no similar provision was made for the market being long, where 
allowances should be removed from the market.   
One other objective that has been mentioned is the elimination of the current excess of EUAs 
in the market. However, the current excess liquidity is only a symptom of the lack of supply-
side flexibility, which has accumulated over time. Since no cure was in place, special measures 
will be needed to address what is no longer a chronic problem, but an acute one. 
In ‘natural’ markets, supply will react to changes in demand. In the case of the ETS, supply is 
fixed through the ETS Directive, on a fixed auction schedule and a free allocation system based 
on benchmarks and historical levels of production.   
The total number of allowances for the trading period is fixed. This is independent of whether 
the assumptions made when the auction schedule was set, including economic projections, are 
still true, or whether we are seeing significant deviations during the trading period. It must be 
emphasised that this lack of flexibility is the outcome of a desire, expressed by many 
stakeholders, to ensure regulatory stability during a trading period.  
4.2 Timing for the introduction of the MSR   
The current proposal specifies that the MSR should start at the beginning of the fourth trading 
phase, in 2021, and proposes transition measures that would spread the additional liquidity 
from the backloaded allowances over three years (2020 to 2022).  
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In this case, the questions that need to be addressed are:  
 If the MSR is needed, why wait? 
 Does early introduction close the door on any other policy choices? 
 What are the pluses and minuses associated with starting the MSR as soon as the legislative process 
would allow it? 
It has been argued that the MSR cannot start during Phase 3, as it would: 
i. Impact inside a trading phase, affecting confidence in the stability of the regulatory process 
and trading strategies of market participants 
ii. Impact EUA prices and future competitiveness of EU industry, at a time when there is no 
clarity on the carbon leakage risk mitigation measures that will be put in place for the post-
2020 period. Simply put, how can we agree to take action that could increase carbon prices 
(through the MSR decision), when we don’t know the impact of the carbon costs (treatment 
of carbon leakage risks) – or “who pays the bill?” 
iii. Run contrary to the political commitment that was made in the backloading decision 
(Decision No 1359/2013/EU of the EU Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC clarifying provisions on the timing of auctions of 
greenhouse allowances), which specified that “beginning on 1 January 2013…the 
Commission shall make no more than one such adaptation for a maximum number of 900 
million allowances” (Art 1). While it could be, and has been, argued that this argument is 
not technically sound, this statement was nevertheless widely interpreted in this manner. 
iv. Some parameters of the MSR are interdependent with other components of the 2030 
climate and energy package. For example, it can be argued that the MSR thresholds will 
be influenced by the 2030 cap and the total amount of allocation to be auctioned. 
On the plus side, however, an early start-up of the MSR (as early as 2016) would ensure that 
the EU ETS starts again to provide a price signal that would be more in line with the signal 
from a market that would have had ‘normal’ elasticity of supply. In this way, the ETS would 
cease to be seen as a residual effort in addressing climate change.  
An added benefit would be the earlier start-up of abatament measures, driven by a price signal 
that reflects a level of scarcity that a market with supply elasticity would show, as well as long-
term scarcity. 
The concerns expressed regarding an earlier start-up of the MSR need to be clearly addressed. 
With respect to competitiveness, the early start-up of the MSR will have a positive impact on 
the amount of abatement in the EU, which would also lower the cost of meeting climate change 
objectives in the long-term, and implicitly help competitiveness.  
Carbon leakage risks to 2020 have been addressed through the new carbon leakage list, while 
the EC has signalled the continuation of measures to address carbon leakage risk post-2020, 
without providing a proposal at this stage. The connection between the MSR and the post-2020 
carbon leakage provisions represents an important negotiating strategy for covered sectors, 
and one that reflects the desire to be re-assured that their needs are recognised in a world of 
asymmetrical climate change policies. 
This is a political and strategic issue, not a technical matter, which should not prevent the early 
start of the MSR. It needs to be treated as such, and any reassurances that industry seeks in 
this respect would also need to come from the political sphere. If anything, in our view, this 
would point more towards the need to speed up the process of approving the 2030 package, 
but not to slowing down the MSR.  
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In our view, the MSR does not represent a one-off change in the auctioning schedule, but rather 
one part of the set of structural changes to be introduced in the EU ETS as called for and 
recognised in the Backloading decision.  
It is difficult, at this time, to clearly identify the relationship between MSR parameters and 
other elements of the 2030 climate and energy framework. In addition, a strong argument can 
also be made that designing and defining parameters for any system, and not only the MSR, 
that is slated to come into operation in 2021-22 (that is, 5-6 years from now) would require a 
considerable leap of faith.  
The world in which the EU ETS will operate will likely be very different not only in terms of 
the cap, but also with respect to the energy mix and energy market functioning. This fact 
would also be reflected in, among other matters, hedging needs. 
To address the concerns outlined above, it would be important to ensure that what is provided 
for is a clear process, and one that allows for the review of the MSR at critical points. This will 
be further outlined in the section on Governance. We do not believe, however, that these 
points, however valid, argue for a delay in MSR approval and implementation. 
To conclude, the arguments in favour of prompt implementation of the MSR fully justify a prompt 
decision on this matter.  
4.3 MSR interaction with other policies 
The MSR can be expected to interact with other EU policies to address climate change, 
including: 
 Treatment of the backloaded amount 
 Renewable energy (RE) target 
 Energy efficiency (EE) target 
 Carbon leakage risk mitigation measures 
 Article 29a of EU ETS 
In addition, the type of liquidity to be captured by MSR is an important issue. Should it be 
restricted to capturing changes in economic cycles, or should it have a broader scope, including 
policy overlaps? 
Amount of compliance units in the market 
Excess EUAs in the market could be regarded as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. ‘Good’ surplus is caused by 
real abatement efforts (including development and deployment of new technologies, impact 
of other policy measures such as those resulting from RE and EE, etc.), or in general, by 
reductions in emissions that are permanent, and therefore ‘structural’. This type of surplus 
must be recognised and welcomed, and should not be penalised or removed from the market.  
On the other hand, a ‘cyclical’ surplus, resulting from economic cycles, needs to be removed 
from the market, as it can be directly attributed to the lack of flexibility of the EU ETS on the 
supply side. 
In the short-to-medium term, it is impractical to try and differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
surplus, as the causes are not immediately evident. However, in the long-term, this may 
become much more feasible. As such, it should be accepted that in the short-to-medium term 
the MSR would capture all excess liquidity, regardless of its nature. 
The significant number of EUAs (compliance units) that are currently in circulation in the EU 
ETS can be traced back to a number of causes: 
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 Impact of the economic recession - cyclical 
 Impact of the RE and EE targets through GHG reductions 
 Mitigation actions undertaken by covered installations in response to carbon and/or 
energy prices. 
 Influx of CERs 
It is important that this difference be taken into account in the long-term, and that the 
parameters be set to account for it. This would imply that in the course of the periodic reviews 
of the MSR, consideration would be given to whether excess EUAs from  ‘structural’ changes 
(e.g. technological improvements) could be re-injected in the market. Surplus of a ‘cyclical’ 
nature should be left in the MSR.  
In any review of the ETS/MSR, decisions to take this excess supply, and put it in the MSR, 
should take into account the causes/origin of the excess.    
Treatment of backloaded amount 
The treatment of the backloaded amount will also have an important impact on the success of 
the MSR, as well as of the EU ETS overall. If the MSR is accepted as a valid proposition, it 
seems to make little sense to re-inject the excess EUAs into the market, only to have the MSR 
work to have that excess removed.  
Re-injecting the backloaded amount into the auctioning schedule, only to create an MSR to 
remove it over time, would cause significant and unnecessary price volatility, and seriously 
damage the effectiveness and credibility of the EU ETS. If there is an acceptance that most of 
the current excess EUAs in the EU ETS is of a “cyclical” nature, then that surplus belongs in 
the MSR.  
As mentioned, this would have the added benefit to also eliminate an unjustifiable, and 
significant, price volatility and zigzag effect, with prices plummeting at the end of Period 3, 
and taking a long time recover.  
Article 29a of ETS 
This article, which has not been invoked so far, is a measure to address abrupt price spikes, 
without being specific on the causes of the price movement. In many ways it is not dissimilar 
in its provisions to the Reserves in California, Quebec, RGGI and Australia in that it brings 
additional supply into the market based on a price trigger.  
In the legislative proposal, its action is now combined with the MSR and would trigger the 
release of the same amount of EUAs (100 million), if the conditions in Article 29a were met. 
There are many reasons for this provision to be eliminated. To start with, it lacks symmetry (it 
only acts on price spikes, but not depressed prices). We feel that any such provision should be 
able to address both excessive, as well as depressed prices. In addition, it breaches the 
argument made in legislative proposal, and that most, if not all stakeholders tend to agree with 
– an MSR trigger should be volumetric, based on liquidity, and not price driven. 
However, it has one redeeming feature, in that it has a different time frame. The MSR, as 
currently envisaged, has essentially a two-year time lag. The time frame for Article 29a is six 
months of prices over the average of the previous two years. In that sense, it has a very 
different function, as it is designed as a tripwire that would prevent rapid spikes, and make 
the system unworkable.   
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Carbon Leakage Risk Mitigation Measures 
Some stakeholders see the MSR, and the treatment of CL risk, as two sides of the same coin: 
one driving carbon prices (MSR), the other one carbon costs (and impacts carbon leakage).  
While this is accurate when it comes to industrial policy and political and negotiating strategy, 
it is not so from an objective and technical point of view.  
Many, but not all, in industry, find it appropriate that industrial policy and political and 
negotiating strategies regarding carbon leakage post-2020 take place on the same timetable as the 
adoption of the MSR. As this is not the case currently, they hesitate to give their support to MRS, 
although they support MSR from a technical point of view. 
 
In the current form of the CL provisions to 2020 (fixed, historical based free allocation), there 
is little interaction between CL provisions and the MSR. We say this in the sense that we see 
no clear evidence that MSR parameters would be influenced by CL risk mitigation measures.  
In addition, while the MSR can be expected to result in higher EUA prices, the carbon price 
that is factored in the determination of the Carbon Leakage List is 30 EUR, much above the 
current market price. This should also provide reassurance to industry that this scenario is 
accounted for. 
In the context of the discussions on the post-2020 CL provisions, there are a number of options 
that are being examined, including demands from industry for a system of allocation for both 
direct and indirect costs, which is also more in line with actual production levels, as well as 
the set aside of the backloaded amount to compensate sectors at risk of carbon leakage 
(including as detailed in the June 23, 2014 Ecofys proposal titled “A Dynamic Allocation Model 
for the EU Emissions Trading System”). 
While it is too early to speculate on the final shape of the post-2020 carbon leakage risk 
mitigation provisions, it is not obvious how, if at all, they would affect the overall shape and 
architecture of the MSR, or vice versa.   
While some examples of interactions can be illustrated, they can and should be addressed 
through the normal governance of the MSR, together with other parameters that will also be 
in need of review. For example, it could be argued that the transfer of the backloaded amount 
directly into the MSR could affect carbon leakage provisions post-2020, as they would not be 
available for a ‘carbon leakage reserve’.   
We see such a decision as part of the initial set up of the MSR, a decision that could be revisited 
post-2020, when the new carbon leakage provisions would come into effect. It is not part of 
the ‘MSR architecture’. 
As many other parameters that will shape the carbon market, changes in the free allocation 
system may lead to the need for adjustments to the value of some of the parameters in the 
MSR.  
That is something that will need to be examined and considered anyway for other changes in 
the EU ETS and its environment, which will occur in the post-2020 period. It is not unique to 
the MSR. Such review will be done in accordance with the governance of the MSR, which is 
discussed below. 
The MSR must be accepted on its own merits to ensure good market functioning, by 
addressing the inflexibility of the supply side of the market. Carbon leakage risk mitigation 
measures are also an issue on their own, and will be introduced if they can be justified, and in 
the form that will be agreed through the legislative process. 
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4.4 Triggers/Thresholds 
Nature of the trigger 
In the course of discussing the MSR during the EC consultations (October 2013 and June 2014), 
as well as in informal meetings (e.g. 3 CEPS Workshops in April, May and June 2014) two main 
issues were raised: the nature of the trigger, and the value of the thresholds. 
There was strong support amongst stakeholder for the use of a volumetric trigger in the MSR, 
based on the supply imbalance in the markets. The current legislative proposal puts forward 
a proposal for such a formula. 
This runs contrary to the practice that is emerging in other jurisdictions (discussed above), 
which uses allowance prices as a trigger for the reserve, in some cases coupled with a price 
floor.   
It must also be said that the EU ETS has in Article 29a a trigger that is price-based. Neither in 
the EU ETS, nor in the other jurisdictions, have the level of the price triggers been reached. As 
such, it is difficult to tell how the market would react. 
The EU ETS structural reform debate, including the MSR, was undoubtedly triggered by the 
persistent low price of carbon in the EU ETS, which is a symptom, but not the problem itself. 
As such, it may be tempting, certainly simpler, but very difficult from a political and 
institutional perspective, to introduce a price corridor in the EU, at the EU level. It would also, 
in our opinion, run contrary to the establishment of the EU ETS as a market based instrument, 
As an indirect price shaper, a volumetric trigger is more complex, and carries additional 
unknowns (e.g. the price elasticity of carbon), but has the merit of being purer from a market 
perspective (it is trying to address good market functioning resulting from a flaw in market 
design). It also has the significant advantage that it is politically implementable in the EU. 
A second issue that was often raised is whether a trigger based solely on number of EUAs in 
the market is truly representative, and will capture accurately the changes in external 
conditions. Different combinations were proposed that would somehow capture GDP and 
production level (for the EU ETS sectors). 
This idea cannot be discarded, should continue to be monitored, and data collected, such that 
a reflection based on real data can be undertaken when the first review of the MSR is 
undertaken. 
For the moment, the principle of Simplicity needs to prevail and the inclusion of too many 
triggers will make the MSR increasingly complex, and difficult to understand. 
Value of the thresholds 
The current value of the threshold’s lower limit at 400 million, and ceiling at 833 million 
allowances, are figures that have a large amount of subjectivity. They have been determined 
in consultation with stakeholders, to allow for an orderly functioning of the carbon market, 
based largely on what are believed to be the hedging needs of the power industry.  
Some stakeholders feel that higher figures are needed in order not to put pressure on the 
demand side and figures offered are higher than in the EC proposal (France proposes 800 
million and 1,300 million). Others feel that lower figures would be better suited. 
While these figures may be appropriate at this time, they are unlikely to stay unchanged, as 
hedging needs vary with many factors, including energy mix, market liberalization, energy 
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prices, etc. As such, the level of the triggers will have to be closely monitored and reviewed as 
part of the MSR governance process. 
4.5 Rate of removal/insertion 
As currently outlined in the legislative proposal, the rate of removal from the MSR (12% of 
excess liquidity, with a minimum of 100 million) and the rate of re-insertion into the auction 
schedule (100 million) are asymmetrical.   
While re insertion rate is constant at 100 million, the removal rate is variable, and can be much 
higher, depending on the surplus in the market.  
It is difficult to justify what would seem as different levels of concern with respect to low prices 
(treated to an increasing absolute amount of EUA removal) and high prices (treated through 
a constant amount of EUA re-injection).  
There is however a balance provided, as a 100 million EUS release from the MSR can also be 
triggered through provisions under Article 29a of the EU ETS. This ensures a quick reaction to 
early warning prices spikes. 
As a general view, it would be preferable that the rate of removal and re-injection in the auction 
schedule be symmetrical, especially as this would signal similar concern for prices that are 
excessive, as for those that are too low. 
Another issue that was also identified was the rate of removal, which in the legislative 
proposal is set at 12%. According to Point Carbon, based on the current surplus and the 
proposed rate of removal, the current surplus would last until somewhere in 2027. This is seen 
as very slow, and not helping to correct the problem within a credible timeframe. Other models 
show an even lower rate of reduction of the surplus. 
Two potential solutions emerge. One solution would to eliminate the rate, and simply decide 
that the solution would be to remove the entire surplus to the upper threshold of 833 million, 
or add enough to the auction schedule to reach the lower threshold (400 million).  
This could be justified if 400-833 million EUAs is seen as the appropriate bandwidth, and 
would have the added benefit that it would provide the consistency in the logic of putting the 
backloaded amount directly in the MSR.   
The one unknown would be market reaction to such an approach, as it may be seen as too 
abrupt. However, this should not be a surprise in the case of the backloaded amount, since the 
proposal of putting the whole backlaoded amount in the MSR has been discussed broadly.   
This is also unlikely to create too much of a shock in any particular year, as it is highly unlikely 
that a huge surplus would emerge year-to-year. It has taken a number of years to build the 
current surplus. 
In addition, such an approach could also impact good market functioning if it should lead to 
situations where there is no auctioning for a significant period. It could increase short-term 
liquidity risks. 
A more conventional solution would be to change the rate from 12% to a higher rate. Point 
Carbon simulations at 20% show an elimination of the market oversupply in 2024. Other rates 
have been suggested that would use different formulas, including 33% of the difference 
between the total surplus and the lower threshold.   
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4.6 Governance 
The governance of the MSR is important, as it needs to reconcile the MSR principles enunciated 
above, with the EU political and institutional realities. The role of the MSR, to try and provide 
flexibility on the supply side of the carbon market, is made complex by the environment in 
which it operates, and the forces it interacts with. Markets, and market forces are 
unpredictable, and trying to define every scenario, and provide for it, would not reflect reality.  
The MSR needs to be predictable and consistent, while at the same time flexible. For the MSR 
to be resilient it must have a governance system, which would allow it to react, within a 
credible timeframe, to changing conditions, in a consistent manner.  
Whether this can be achieved will depend to a large degree on how one defines, and 
operationalises, consistency and predictability. It can be interpreted as ensuring that all 
interventions are completely rule-based, formula-driven, without any opportunity for human 
judgment. Alternatively, it can be defined as totally driven by human judgment, and guided 
to some degree by rules and formulas. This is what some would advocate in the form of a 
‘carbon bank’. 
We would prefer to define consistency and predictability, as an approach that ensures that the 
objectives and rules are clear, they do not change without due process, and are easy to 
understand, by all stakeholders. We have to recall that not all stakeholders have the same 
access to information, or the same ability and/or inclination to monitor and interpret rules and 
equations that govern the market.  
However, at the same time, the MSR governance system must also include provisions that 
would allow human judgment to evaluate the situation, and set the direction and parameters 
at inflection points, for those parameters that may require such interventions. 
Therefore, the formulas that are put forward in the legislative proposal, with the caveats and 
comments mentioned in this paper, will form the backbone of the MSR governance.   
However, in the course of this paper we have also highlighted moments when there needs to 
be a check for market balance adjustment needs (cyclical vs structural liquidity variations). 
While these checks can be periodic, it would seem to us that the current proposal of a 5-year 
period might be too long, especially when the MSR is in its infancy. 
In addition, the opportunity to initiate a review should be provided between the scheduled 
checks. This could be done in a number of ways, including when the reserve signals through 
its size that something more fundamental has happened. 
Alternative approaches could include the use of the Carbon Market Report, or a Committee of 
Experts, to recommend that a review of the MSR be initiated.  
What is equally important is that provisions be included to ensure that all appropriate 
parameters be monitored in order to allow for a comprehensive and objective review, and, if 
deemed necessary, update the MSR.  As mentioned above, while this may not be practical in 
the short-to mid-term, in the long term it will be important to understand the causes of a 
surplus that was been parked in the MSR – and whether it belongs in there or not (is it a “good” 
or a “bad” surplus?). 
Conclusions 
The MSR cannot be seen as a stand-alone proposition, but needs to be contextualised. The MSR 
must be seen as a principled, consistent, and long-term approach for the good functioning of the 
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EU ETS. It would help to avoid a future backloading, which must then be seen as a temporary 
and ad hoc measure, a stopgap.  
Acceptance of the fact that there can be a cyclical imbalance in the EU ETS, as illustrated by 
the one that currently exists in the EU ETS, can only lead to the conclusion that an MSR is 
needed.  The EU ETS was not built for the scenario of a severe disruption in the economic 
cycle, however reality turned out to be significantly different. 
The justification for postponing the introduction of the MSR until the end of Phase 3 of the EU 
ETS needs to be balanced against market realities. There are no technical impediments to its 
immediate introduction that cannot be addressed through good governance. Postponement 
will only result in probable and significant price volatility at the end of Phase 3, as backloaded 
supply is re-injected, only to be removed by the MSR.  
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Appendix 1. Flexibility in other jurisdictions 
The EU, through the EU ETS, has been a pioneer in introducing carbon-pricing mechanisms 
(CPM). Since 2005, many other jurisdictions have observed the functioning of the EU ETS, 
internalized lessons learned, and have applied them to their own CPMs. This is the case of the 
design of Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the California ETS in the US, and 
the CPM that was operational in Australia until recently. 
In discussing what others have done, we need to recognize that the EU ETS is much broader 
in scope than the markets mentioned above, and has been in operation much longer. As such, 
the history that would allow one to draw lessons from the operation of these systems is limited 
at best. 
In addition, some of the solutions that were applied in other jurisdictions need to be seen 
within the context of the political and legislative processes in those jurisdictions, which in 
some case are significantly different from the realities of the EU. Solutions cannot be 
transposed in a vacuum, without considering political realities.  
a) California 
It must first be emphasized that the positioning of the California ETS is fundamentally 
different than that of the EU ETS. The EU ETS in the central pillar of the EU’s climate change 
policy and carbon price is conceived as the driver to de-carbonization. The California ETS is a 
“residual mechanism”, in that it induces reductions not achieved through regulations 
(“complementary measures”). 
California has addressed the flexibility of supply side both from a floor and ceiling perspective. 
It has introduced a price floor at $10/ton, which addresses a potential excess liquidity in the 
market, and ensures a minimum reassurance for those that make long-term investment 
commitments based on carbon prices. The price floor does not differentiate between the 
origins of the excess allowances. It assumes that in the short-to-medium term, no revolutionary 
solution will emerge that would push prices at level lower than the floor. 
The excess of allowances is addressed through two mechanisms. One is the Allowance Price 
Containment Reserve (APCR), which is comprised of allowances that are withheld from the 
California budget each year. Compliance entities can access the APCR (APCR allowances 
cannot be traded) six weeks after each regular auction, at three different Tier levels 
($42.38/$47.68/$52.98). These prices are significantly above the current California allowance 
prices. Processes for increasing the APCR in case it becomes depleted are currently 
contemplated. 
As a secondary measure, allowances that do not clear the regular auctions, are put into an 
Auction Holding Account and brought back after a two regular auctions clear.  
These two provisions taken together provide for long term economic cycles that will put 
pressure on prices (APCR), and short term price spikes (Auction Holding Account) 
The Quebec ETS, which is currently linked to California, has a system that is very similar, with 
some non-essential differences. 
As a conclusion, the California system recognizes that there is a lack of flexibility and tries to 
avoid extreme price volatility that would make the system unworkable (too high) or irrelevant 
(too low). It is targeting prices, not volumes. It is largely based on pre-determined formulas, 
with the possibility of executive intervention in more extreme cases (but not restricted to ETS). 
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b) RGGI 
RGGI has also provided for a floor price and a Cost Containment Reserve.  Like in California 
the price in the CCR is indexed and is allowances are available at a set reserve price.  
In the RGGI case the system targets prices and not volumes, and has a fixed set of pre 
determined rules. 
c) Australia 
The new government has dismantled the Australia CPM July 2014.  However, innovative ideas 
were part of that design, and while it is difficult to tell how effective its approach would have 
been as it was never tested, the ideas and principles need to be reflected upon. It contained a 
combination of human intervention and pre-determined actions, and targeted the 
determination of the cap. 
In the Australian CPM, the Climate Change Authority (CCA), an independent body appointed 
by the Prime Minister for 5 years, had to issue every year a report entitled “Targets and 
Progress Review” which outlines 
 Australia’s progress towards its medium and long term reduction targets 
 Australia’s emissions reduction goals. 
In this report the CCA put forward the cap for the fifth year of the rolling five-year CPM cap. 
The Government has to review the report, write reasons for decision and had to issue a 
regulation with the 5th year cap.  
The Government regulation had to pass Parliament, or, if rejected, was automatically replaced 
with a cap pre-set through CPM act.  
d) China 
The pilot ETS in China do not currently have any reserve provisions. However, discussions 
with Chinese officials and stakeholders seem to indicate that those who design these systems 
are fully aware of the current predicament in the EU ETS and understand its root causes.  No 
concrete measures have been put in place so far to address this issue. 
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